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Abstract
An increasing number of individuals are turning to Direct-To-Consumer (DTC) genetic testing to learn about their
predisposition to diseases, traits, and/or ancestry. DTC companies like 23andme and Ancestry.com have started to
offer popular and affordable ancestry and genealogy tests, with services allowing users to find unknown relatives and
long-distant cousins. Naturally, access and possible dissemination of genetic data prompts serious privacy concerns,
thus motivating the need to design efficient primitives supporting private genetic tests. In this paper, we present an
effective protocol for privacy-preserving genetic relatedness test (PPGRT), enabling a cloud server to run relatedness
tests on input an encrypted genetic database and a test facility’s encrypted genetic sample. We reduce the test to a
data matching problem and perform it, “privately”, using searchable encryption. Finally, a performance evaluation of
hamming distance based PP-GRT attests to the practicality of our proposals.
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, advances in genomics and genome sequencing are not only enabling progress in medicine
and healthcare, but are also bringing genetic testing to the masses, as an increasing number of “Direct To Consumer”
(DTC) companies have entered, and sometimes disrupted, the market. For instance, 23andme.com offers a $99/£129
assessment of inherited traits, genealogy, and congenital risk factors, through genotyping of a saliva sample posted via
mail, and Ancestry.com also offers low-cost genotyping-based DNA tests.
In this paper, we focus a popular test offered by many DTC companies, namely, Genetic Relatedness Test (GRT).
This is used to identify whether or not a pair of individuals are closely related, genetically speaking. The standard
approach to relative identification is to detect the identity-by-descent (IBD) segments between the individuals, and
further identify the degree of relatedness via the amount of shared IBD segments [22]. The quantity of shared IBD
segments is then detected from the phased haplotypes (note a haplotype is a group of genes within an organism that
was inherited together from a single parent) of (a pair of) individuals, which are the specific groups of genes that a
progeny inherits from one parent and consists of a fixed number of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs are the
most common form of DNA variation occurring when a single nucleotide differs between members of the same species
or paired chromosomes of an individual [25]).
Nevertheless, GRT services available today require individuals to send their genetic data (in plaintext) to possibly
untrusted DTC companies. Furthermore, collected genetic data is often impossible to anonymize [19] and hard to
protect from intentional or accidental leakage. Privacy risks from individual genetic exposure have been studied
extensively [2], thus motivating the need to design a GRT algorithms that can operate without accessing genetic data
in the clear and violating individuals’ privacy.
We focus on genomic data that has already been phased into haplotypes and assume that the haplotypes of a pair
of individuals with the same length are both interpreted by letters “A, G, C, T”, so that the problem of detecting
IBD shared segments is reduced to the identification of the shared positions of two equal-length strings. Dynamic
programming can then be used to calculate shared positions, e.g., edit distance, hamming distance and longest common
subsequence (LCS) algorithms.
∗A preliminary version of this paper appears in the Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Genome Privacy and Security (GenoPri’16)
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1.1 Related Work
Overall, the research community has dedicated a lot of attention to genomic privacy, and proposed cryptographic
techniques for privacy-preserving genetic testing [3, 4, 5, 7, 11, 13, 14, 15, 28]. Prior work on secure (two-party)
computation could also be used to protect privacy in relatedness test protocol building on traditional cryptographic
primitives like homomorphic encryption (e.g. [26]), private set intersection (e.g. [24]), and garbled circuits based
secure computation (e.g. [23]). Some existing two-party secure distance computation protocols could also come to help
here, for example, private set intersection [16], privacy-preserving approximating edit distance [29] based on garbled
circuit and oblivious transfer, oblivious transfer based hamming distance system [9], or a homomorphic computation
of edit distance [12]. These two-party computation tools can be extended into a cloud-based context involving a
trusted cloud server (with fully access to an online database consisting of a number of individuals’ genetic data) and
a relatedness test service (client) with its own genetic information. The client could use a additively homomorphic
encryption scheme, e.g., Paillier cryptosystem [21], to encrypt a haplotype and send it (along with the public key)
to the server. The server would then encrypt each haplotype in its database using the same encryption algorithm,
“subtract” client’s encryption by the encrypted haplotype, and return the results to the client. The latter could then
decrypt and identify the quantity of shared positions by checking the number of 0’s decrypted.
Two recent works [20, 18] open a new perspective for privacy-friendly GRT by using fuzzy encryption technique.
In these systems, each individual first compresses its haplotype into a 0/1 string, called private genome sketch, and
then “encrypts” the sketch by using a random row of a given error correct code matrix. One may detect if user A is
relative by downloading A’s encrypted sketch, and next “decrypting” the sketch with its own private genome sketch.
If the decryption closely leads to a row in the matrix, the haplotypes of both individuals are approximately matched.
However, all the aforementioned computation approaches do not really scale well in practice, as they all suffer from
an important limitation, i.e., the client is burdened with heavy computation and communication overhead, as it has
to download all related “encrypted” results from the server and perform a huge numbers of decryption to identify the
relatedness. How to design scalable privacy-preserving GRT that can scale on both server and client side constitutes
the main motivation for our work.
1.2 Roadmap
This paper presents a novel, efficient Privacy-Preserving Genetic Relatedness Test (PPGRT) protocol that relies on the
cloud’s computational power. Generally speaking, we allow the cloud to perform GRT by only given an encrypted
genetic database and an encrypted personal haplotype, as opposed to the traditional context where the cloud is able to
fully access the database. Before instantiating the protocol, we first discuss how PPGRT protocol can be generically
constructed on top of a public key searchable encryption (e.g. [8]) and a symmetric key encryption cryptosystems.
Next, we propose a concrete construction building on searchable encryption technique [27]. Specifically, we encode
the haplotypes stored on the cloud server as a bunch of search trapdoors, and the haplotype uploaded by a test issuer
(i.e., the client) is interpreted as a set of search indices. An IBD shared segment detection is then reduced to a
searchable matching problem, i.e., finding a match indicating a shared segment.
Note that the method does not leak information to cloud server even if the server knows the length of shared
segment as long as the secrecy of haplotypes is guaranteed. It is worth mentioning that the paper is the first to explore
searchable encryption technique into relatedness test. We hope this work will inspire a new perspective for the future
genomic privacy research.
2 Privacy-Preserving Genetic Relatedness Testing (PPGRT)
2.1 System Framework and Definition
We assume a genetic data sequence is represented as a haplotype consisting of five basic letters {A,G,C, T, ∗}, where
∗ denotes a piece of unknown/unmarked information, and assume the length of each letter is l. As illustrated in Fig. 1,
there are four parties in a Genetic Relatedness Test (GRT) system, which mirrors the one introduced by Ayday et al.
in [6], specifically:
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Figure 1: System Model.
1. System Users (SUs). System users’ plain genetic information are collected and phased into haplotypes by a
trusted and certified institution, e.g. local health/medical center.
2. Certified Institution (CI). A trusted CI collects system users’ plain genetic data to form a genome database
(GDB), and encrypts GDB to an EDB. Later, CI outsources EDB to a storage and processing unit in which
genetic relatedness testing is performed.
3. Storage and Processing Unit (SPU). A SPU stores EDB locally and meanwhile, it is mainly responsible for
running relatedness test as well as returning the test result to a test issuer. Note that SPU knows nothing about
the underlying data stored in EDB.
4. Test Issuer (TI). A TI encrypts its phased haplotype via an asymmetric key encryption mechanism, and sends
the encryption to the SPU. After the test, the SPU returns the result to the TI without learning any (underlying
haplotype) information.
Algorithms. The system consists of the following algorithms:
1. (sk, pk)← Setup(1k): on input a security parameter k, output public parameter and secret key for the system.
2. EDB ← GenEDB(sk, pk,GDB): on input secret key sk, public parameter pk and a plain genome database,
output an encrypted genome database EDB. We assume that GDB consists of a list of plain haplotypes, i.e.
GDB = (hi)
d
i=1, and EDB is a list of index/encrypted haplotype pairs, i.e. EDB = (indi, Hi)
d
i=1, where
|indi| = |hi|, and d is the total number of haplotypes.
3. C ← GenQuery(pk,X): on input public parameter pk and a plain haplotype information, output an encrypted
haplotype C.
4. QL ← Test(pk,EDB,C): on input public parameter pk, EDB and an encrypted query, output a set QL
whereby the set includes d test results between an encrypted query C and each encrypted haplotype in EDB.
2.2 Black-box PPGRT
We highlight that Privacy-Preserving Genetic Relatedness Testing (PPGRT) can be generically constructed from a
public key based searchable encryption (PKSE) and a symmetric encryption scheme. Using [8]’s definition for PKSE,
and given a PKSE ((SK,PK)← KeyGen(1k), S ← PEKS(PK,W ), T ← Trapdoor(SK,W ) (note we assume
3
that randomness is already taken in algorithms PEKS and Trapdoor, so that each trapdoor and each index “look”
uniformly random in the view of SPU.), 1/0 ← Test(PK,S, T )), a symmetric encryption (key ← SSE.Key(1k),
EDB ← SSE.Enc(key,DB), DB ← SSE.Dec(key,EDB)), we can build a generic PPGRT construction as
follows:
1. Setup(1k): run KeyGen(1k) algorithm to generate (SK, PK), and SSE.Key(1k) algorithm to generate key,
and set (SK, key) and PK to be sk and pk, respectively.
2. GenEDB(sk, pk,GDB): run SSE.Enc(key, hi) algorithm d times to encrypt each plaintext haplotype hi to
become an encrypted value Hi, and further run Trapdoor(SK,W
j
i ) algorithm to build a searchable trapdoor
T ji for each letter W
j
i in a haplotype hi, where j ∈ [1, |hi|]. We have EDB = (indi = (T 1i , ...., T |hi|i ), Hi)di=1.
3. GenQuery(pk,X): run PEKS(PK,W j) to generate a search index Sj for each letter W j in the haplotype
X , and further set C = (S1, ..., S|X|), where j ∈ [1, |X|].
4. Test(pk,EDB,C): given two-equal length “sequences” C = (S1, ..., S|X|) and indi = (T 1i , ...., T
|hi|
i ), the
calculation of shared (positions) length is reduced to the counting of the number of “0” output by the algorithm
Test. Some dynamic distance programming algorithms (e.g. hamming/edit distance) can be used here. By
intaking an index sequence C and a trapdoor sequence indi (with equal length), for j = 1 to |X|, the algorithm
checks the output of Test(PK,Sj , T ji ). If the algorithm outputs 0, indicating there is a mismatch for the
corresponding j-th position (of both sequences), we add 1 to the distance. We calculate the shared length
(between C and Hi) by subtracting |X| with the distance, and store the result as an i-th tuple in QL. After d
rounds of the test, output QL.
PPGRT Security. A secure PPGRT system needs to guarantee that: (1) EDB must not leak the underlying encrypted
sensitive haplotype data to SPU, (2) SPU cannot learn the underlying haplotype embedded in the search index indi,
and (3) the underlying haplotype cannot be compromised from the test result QL by SPU.
Under the assumption that the underlying symmetric key encryption is chosen plaintext secure, and the underlying
PKSE is secure against chosen keyword attacks with trapdoor privacy [17], the above generic construction is secure.
Since the generic construction PPGRT consists of two parts, namely encrypted data and encrypted search index
structure, its security mainly depends on two aspects: one is the security of the underlying symmetric key encryption,
and the other one is the security of the PKSE. The chosen plaintext security of the symmetric encryption guarantees
the secrecy of the underlying haplotype. The security holding against chosen keyword attacks is used to ensure the
query haplotype search index (issued by TI) to be hidden from the view of search server. The trapdoor privacy of the
PKSE is to protect the haplotype embedded in the searchable trapdoor from being known by the “curious” server. The
security of the whole PPGRT construction can be proved by following the universally composable model (introduced
in [10]) with the above security assumption.
2.3 Paillier’s Encryption System
Below we review the Paillier Encryption. Please refer to [21] for more definition and technical details. We let n = pq
be a safe number, Bα ∈ Z∗n2 be the set of elements of order nα, B be their disjoint union for α = 1, ..., λ, where
p = 2p′+1, q = 2q′+1, p, p′, q, q′ are large primes, Carmichael’s function λ(n) = lcm(p−1, q−1), and set λ(n) to
be λ. Suppose g is a base of B, and set L(x) = x−1n . In Paillier encryption system, we set (n, g) as public parameters,
and λ as secret key. The encryption algorithms works as
Enc(x, r) : y = gx · rn mod n2,
where y is the ciphertext, x is the message, r is a random value, and x < n, r < n. The decryption algorithm runs as
Dec(y, λ) : x =
L(yλ mod n2)
L(gλ mod n2)
mod n,
where the ciphertext y < n2.
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The Paillier encryption supports the following homomorphic properties:
∀ σ ∈ Z+, Dec(yσ, λ) = σx mod n;∀ y1, y2 ∈ Zn2 , Dec(y1y2, λ) = x1 + x2 mod n.
2.4 A Basic Concrete Construction
Following the generic construction, we now build a concrete system for PPGRT (via the usage of LCS) on top of a
single keyword equality variant of the searchable encryption scheme [27]. In the construction, we revise the LCS algo-
rithm (note our LCS algorithm is revised from the one given in http://introcs.cs.princeton.edu/java/96optimization/LCS.java.)
so that it only outputs the shared length between a pair of encrypted haplotypes but not the LCS sequence.
• Setup(1k): The CI chooses two target collision resistant hash functions H : {0, 1}l → Zn, H0 : G1 → Zn,
σ ∈R Z+, a cyclic group G1 = 〈P 〉 with order n (P is a base of the group, the computation is based on
the modulus n), sets β = σλ mod φ(n2), γ = σL(gλ mod n2) mod n, where λ, g, L are parameters in
Paillier encryption (please refer to the previous section and [21] for more details), and Euler’s Totient function
φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1), and φ(n2) = nφ(n). The CI sets system public key as pk = (1k, g,H, P, n, β, L), sets
its secret key as sk = (σ, γ, λ), and sends SPU a public key tuple spk = (1k, β, L, n).
• GenEDB(sk, pk, GDB): Before delivering a GDB to an SPU, the CI encrypts it as follows. Below we use Yi
to denote a plain haplotype.
1. For i = 1 to d, the CI runs as
(a) Given pk and a haplotype Yi with length t, the CI works as follows. To randomize each letter, for
each Wj ∈ {A,G,C, T, ∗} (j ∈ [1, t]), the CI randomly chooses new random ρj , ηj ∈R Zn, and sets
bj = ρjH0(ηjP ) and sj = ρjγH(Wj)H0(ηjP ). The haplotype’s encrypted index sequence indi
now is represented by a set of Ti in which T
j
i = (bj , sj). For convenience, we use a notation (B,S)
later, where |B| = |S| = t, B stores random factors bj and S is with a set of random sj . Note that
CI will choose a pair of distinct random factors (ρ, η) for each letter so as to avoid the case where the
repeated letters share with the same random pair. For example, for a two-bit string AA, CI chooses
random factors ρ1, η1 and ρ2, η2 for the first and second A, respectively.
(b) The CI also encrypts Yi by using a symmetric key encryption system SY E = (SY E.KEY , SY E.ENC,
SY E.DEC). It sets key ← SY E.KEY (1k), and computes Zi = SY E.ENC(Yi, key). We sup-
pose the length of key is identical to that of Yi, such that the symmetric encryption is a perfect
one-time pad to Yi.
2. The CI finally outputs an EDB = (indi, Zi)di=1.
• GenQuery(pk, X): Before sending its haplotype sequence X to the SPU for relatedness test, the TI encrypts
the sequence as follows. Suppose |X| = m, and X = (W1, ...,Wm). The TI sets cj = gH(Wj) · rnj mod n2,
and interprets the sequence as C = (c1, ..., cm), where rj ∈R Zn, cj is a Paillier encryption for H(Wj), and
j ∈ {1, ...,m}. Each Wj is hidden (with uniformly random value rj) by the Paillier probabilistic encryption.
• Test(spk, EDB, C): Given an encrypted EDB and an encrypted haplotype sequence C, the SPU first extracts
a tuple (Bz, Sz) of an encrypted haplotype Zz from the EDB, where z ∈ [1, d] and |Sz| = t. From z = 1 to
d, the SPU runs the algorithm PPLCS(Bz, Sz, C) (see the privacy-preserving longest common subsequence
Algorithm 1), and finally outputs the length of the shared positions between Zz and C. Note that we use Bz[i]
and Sz[i] to denote the i-th element in arrayBz and Sz , respectively. Note that the LCS algorithm here is revised
from the one shared in Princeton Java Library (http://introcs.cs.princeton.edu/java/96optimization/LCS.java.).
Since the correctness mainly follows that of [27], we can have the check below.
One may verify the equality of ( L(C[j]β·Bz [i] mod n2) == Sz[i] (mod n) ) to see if the letter Wi in Sz[i]
is equal to the letter Wj in the encryption C[j] as in [27]. Since the decryption algorithm of Paillier encryption
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Algorithm 1 Privacy-Preserving Longest Common Subsequence
1: procedure PPLCS(Bz , Sz , C)
2: int w[0, ..., t, 0, ...,m];
3: for i = 0 to t do { w[i, 0] = 0; }
4: for j = 0 to m do { w[0, j] = 0; }
5: for i = 1 to t do {
6: for j = 1 to m do {
7: if ( L(C[j]β·Bz [i] mod n2) == Sz[i] (mod n) ) { w[i, j] = 1 + w[i− 1, j − 1]; }
8: else if (w[i− 1, j] ≥ w[i, j − 1]) { w[i, j] = w[i− 1, j]; }
9: else { w[i, j] = w[i, j − 1]; }
10: }
11: }
12: return w[t,m];
system can be represented as ξ(H(xj)) =
L((C[j]ξ)λ mod n2)
L(gλ mod n2)
(mod n), we have ξ(H(xj)) · L(gλ mod n2) =
L((C[j]ξ)λ mod n2) (mod n). Set ξ = ρiσH0(ηiP ), we have
ρiσH0(ηiP )(H(xj))L(g
λ mod n2) = L((C[j]ρiσH0(ηiP ))λ mod n2) (mod n)
ρiH(xj)H0(ηiP )σL(g
λ mod n2) = L(C[j]ρiσH0(ηiP )λ mod n2) (mod n)
ρiH(xj)H0(ηiP )γ = L(C[j]
B[i]β mod n2) (mod n)
If the letter xj (on the left hand side of the equation) is equal to the letterWj embedded in the encryption C[j], we then
definitely have ρiH(xj)H0(ηiP )γ = L(C[j]B[i]β mod n2) (mod n), so that S[i] = L(C[j]B[i]β mod n2) (mod n).
We note that the equation can be checked by SPU without knowing sk.
The concrete construction above is secure assuming the underlying symmetric encryption is secure, the Paillier
encryption is secure and [27] is secure with trapdoor privacy in the indistinguishability of ciphertext from random
game. We note that the details of the proof follow that of [27].
2.5 Improvements and Extensions
In the previous section, a basic concrete construction for our generic PPGRT is built based on the searchable encryption
scheme [27]. It is not fully secure yet because of suffering from deterministic identifier and offline keyword guessing
attacks. Below we present some solutions to tackle the attacks and meanwhile, we show that the construction can be
extended to friendly support edit and hamming distance algorithms.
2.5.1 Eliminating Deterministic Identifier for H(W)
From the construction of the haplotype encrypted index sequence, we can see that bj and sj are constructed as
ρjH0(ηjP ) and ρjγH(Wj)H0(ηjP ), respectively. Recall that the tuple (bj , sj) is given to the SPU. Here, a ma-
licious SPU can easily obtain δj = sj/bj = γH(Wj). Taking two distinct δj and δ′j , the malicious SPU can compute
gcd(δj , δ
′
j) to recover γ. With knowledge of γ, it may correctly guess the haplotype sequence, since the message
space (m ∈ {A,G,C, T, ∗}) is relatively small in our context. To prevent the attack, the CI may choose to add ran-
dom factor into the hash function. It can choose a random value, say s ∈ Zn, so that sj = ρjγH ′(Wj , s)H0(ηjP ),
where H ′ is a new target collision resistance hash function so that H ′ : {0, 1}l × Zn → Zn. Now, even being able
to achieve γH(Wj , s), the malicious SPU may not easily guess what is the input of the hash function. This naive
solution, however, incurs another deterministic issue. While the input of the hash function is identical - meaning that
a SNPs letter is repeated, the hash output leads to the same value, for example, H(Wi = A, s) = H(Wj = A, s).
In such a case, the malicious SPU may make use of some statistical analysis (e.g., 70% of the repetition occurs
for the letter A or C) to reveal the whole haplotype sequence. A better countermeasure is to bring more ran-
dom factors into the construction of sj . Specifically, the CI may set sj = (ρjγ0H0(ηjP ) + γjzj)H ′(Wj , sj),
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kj = ajzj , where aj , zj , sj ∈R Zn, γ0 = σL(gλ mod n2)mod n and γj = (ajL(gλ mod n2)mod n)/λ.
Note the indi now includes (B, S, K), where K is the set of all kj . Accordingly, the equality check needs to
be revised as ( L(C[j]β·Bz [i]+Kz [i] mod n2) == Sz[i] (mod n) ). One may check the correctness by setting
ξ = ρjσH0(ηjP ) + ajzj/λ. Note we will talk about the random factor sj later.
Since the message space of haplotype is relative small, {A,G,C, T, ∗}, it is extremely important for CI to produce
randomly indistinguishable index sequence in the privacy point of view. Recall that this index sequence can be exactly
seen as a searchable trapdoor (in our generic PPGRT construction). Therefore, the privacy of the index sequence
is now reduced to the trapdoor privacy. There have been some research works that introduce effective methods to
tackle the trapdoor privacy issue, e.g. [1]. The crucial idea behind trapdoor privacy is to disable SPU’s ability of
telling/identifying the relationship between (any) two given trapdoors (with respective keywords inside). It is much
like the anonymity feature in the context of identity-based encryption. The premise of doing so is to ensure a fresh
randomness to each trapdoor. We here recommend readers to take a public key-based searchable encryption system
with trapdoor privacy as an input building block to our generic PPGRT “compiler”, while attempting to construct a
concrete scheme, so as to guarantee the privacy of haplotype encrypted index sequence.
2.5.2 Protecting against Offline Keyword Dictionary Attack
Since the Paillier encryption algorithm is publicly known, the SPU may launch offline keyword dictionary attack to
guess the information of the haplotypes stored in its database. Specifically, the SPU can randomly choose a haplotype
sequence X ′ = (W ′1, ...,W
′
m), and further runs the algorithm GenQuery to generate an encrypted sequence C
′. By
running the algorithm Test with input C ′ and a client’s haplotype-hidden index indi stored in EDB, the SPU may
learn how similarity the two sequences share with. Accordingly, the client’s haplotype information definitely suffers
from a leakage risk. To thwart this possible attack, our system allows the CI to share a secret information s, being
seen as an extra input for the hash function, with the TI via a well-studied and efficient Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol (in DES way) with EBC mode, so that the TI will construct each encrypted element cj (of the corresponding
letter Wj) as H(Wj , s). Accordingly, the secret information s has to be put in the index element sj by the CI as
well. The SPU will fail to launch effective offline keyword dictionary attack, since it cannot compute a valid hash
value without knowledge of the shared secret s. The key exchange protocol above can be seen as a permission granted
from the CI, so that the TI can proceed to the test phase. Imagine that in practice, a public tester usually needs to
request a test permission from the EDB owner, i.e. the CI, even the EDB is outsourced to the SPU. If the CI grants the
permission, it will share the secret information with the TI; otherwise, nothing will be shared.
To keep consistency with the revision introduced in the previous subsection, a random factor s is replaced with a
sˆ = (s1, ...., st), where sj ∈R Zn and j ∈ [1, t]. We note that there is no need for the CI and the TI to share with the
whole vector sˆ in the exchange protocol. For example, the CI may leverage the equation axj + b to calculate the value
sj , where a, b ∈R Zn and xj is some “common” information that the TI knows as well (e.g. xj = H(pj ,Wj), where
pj is the current position of the letter Wj on the sequence). In this case, the CI will only need to share a, b with the TI
in the key exchange protocol.
Algorithm 2 Privacy-Preserving Hamming Distance Algorithm
1: procedure PPLCS(Bz , Sz , C)
2: int seg = 0;
3: if (t ! =m) { Please input equal length segments. } //Recall that |C| = m which is the test issuer’s encrypted sequence, while
|Sz| = t which is the genomic index sequence, and Bz is the random factor sequence.
4: else for i = 1 to t do {
5: if ( L(C[i]β·Bz [i] mod n2) == Sz[i] (mod n) ) { seg ++; }
6: }
7: return seg;
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Algorithm 3 Privacy-Preserving Edit Distance Algorithm
1: procedure PPLCS(Bz , Sz , C)
2: int len1 = m; int len2 = t; int len = 0;
3: if (len1 < len2) { len = len2; }
4: else { len = len1; }
5: int [][] dp = new int [len1 + 1] [len2 + 1];
6: for i = 0 to len1 do { dp[i][0] = i; }
7: for j = 0 to len2 do { dp[0][j] = j; }
8: for i = 0 to len1− 1 do
9: for j = 0 to len2− 1 do {
10: if ( L(C[i]β·Bz [j] mod n2) == Sz[j] (mod n) ) { dp[i+ 1][j + 1] = dp[i][j]; }
11: else {
12: int replace = dp[i][j] + 1;
13: int insert = dp[i][j + 1] + 1;
14: int delete = dp[i+ 1][j] + 1;
15: int min = replace > insert?insert : replace;
16: min = delete > min?min : delete;
17: dp[i+ 1][j + 1] = min;
18: }
19: }
20: return len− dp[len1][len2];
2.5.3 Hamming Distance based PPGRT
We state that our concrete construction is naturally compatible with edit distance and hamming distance algorithms.
The intuition is to see the equation highlighted in the box in Algorithm 1 as a condition for distance counting – that
is, if the equation does not hold (indicating a mismatch), we proceed to a distance adding operation – and, meanwhile,
the final output is set to only show the shared length of two given strings. The privacy-preserving hamming distance
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2, in which we assume that each segment of the test issuer’s encrypted sequence
(being taken into the algorithm) is with the same length of the genomic index.
2.5.4 Privacy Preserving via Edit Distance
The privacy-preserving variant for edit distance algorithm is presented in Algorithm 3. We note that the output of our
privacy-preserving edit distance algorithm is somewhat different from that of the original edit distance algorithm –
outputting the number of the “difference” of two strings.
3 Performance Evaluation
We also perform an efficiency evaluation for our protocols, aiming to demonstrate that the overhead imposed to both CI
and TI are appreciably low. We implement the concrete construction using MD5 as the cryptographic hash function,
a 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman key agreement (for sharing a secret hash function input between CI and TI only), and
Item Description
Computer MacBook Pro OS X Yosemite 10.10.5
CPU 2.70GHz Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5257U
Memory DDR 3, 8 GB, 1867 MHz
Flash Storage 120.11 GB
Programming Platform Eclipse IDE Mars.2 Release (4.5.2)
Programming Language Java Version 1.8.0 60
Table 1: Test Bed Details
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Item Description
Database 1000 Genomes1
Phase 1000 Genomes phase 3 release
Dataset Name NA12828
Biosample ID SAME125076
Superpopulation European (EUR)
Population Code CEU
Population Description Utah residents (CEPH) with Northern and Western European ancestry
Gender Female
Table 2: Experimental Sample. ∗The size of dataset is total 565.8 MB, including 4,743,960 genomic strings. But we only choose
to use the first 10,000 strings of that, with the size about 1.1 MB, for the our test.
Figure 2: Running Time of Non-Privacy-Preserving Distance Algorithms
Paillier cryptosystem with 2048-bit moduli. The experimental test bed is shown in Table 1 below. We here use real
SNPs database to test the running time and accuracy of our privacy-preserving algorithms. We show the SNPs sample
details in Table 2.
We further assume that there is a pair of haplotypes, one encrypted by CI, and the other encrypted by TI: both
encryptions will be sent to SPU for two groups of test - one group of test is for original (non-privacy-preserving) LCS,
edit and hamming distance algorithms, and the other is for privacy-preserving ones. Note that both test groups will
intake the identical haplotype sample. Our pair of haplotypes are in the “A, G, C, T” format with the length 36×500
letter bits (note in this paper we refer one letter to as a letter bit, e.g. “AG” are two letter bits). For matching 1000
Genomes’ data format, we cut a total 18,000 letter bits haplotype into 500 segments of which contains 36 letter bits.
Note that the running times of each algorithm are averaged over 100 executions.
The running time of non-privacy-preserving distance algorithms is depicted in Figure 2. It can be seen that ham-
ming distance algorithm significantly outperforms edit distance algorithm, while the LCS suffers from the worst per-
formance. The running time test here appropriately show the efficiency of the three algorithms. The running time
of privacy-preserving hamming distance algorithm (in Figure 3) only takes approximately 900s to finish the test by
intaking two encrypted haplotypes with 36×500 SNPs letter bits, while the privacy-preserving LCS and edit distance
(nearly overlapped) requires over 104s. Accordingly, dealing with phased haplotype, it is better to leverage hamming
distance algorithm as a secure building block for our PPGRT.
We here state that the matching result of using privacy-preserving algorithms is identical to that of using original
algorithms by inputing the same sample, 36×500 SNPs. Note that please refer to our supplement test materials.
We therefore conclude that the privacy-preserving algorithms maintain the exact test accuracy compared to the ones
without any privacy protection.
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Figure 3: Running Time of Storage and Processing Unit
However, the privacy-preserving algorithms, specially for edit distance and LCS, suffer from huge efficiency loss
as a price to maintain privacy. This research work creates an interesting open problem on how to improve the test
efficiency without loss of privacy.
4 Conclusion
This research work introduced an interesting observation about how to generically construct a privacy preserving
relatedness test protocol based on public key searchable encryption, and next proposed a concrete construction as well
as its performance evaluation. The evaluation showed that our construction built on top of hamming distance algorithm
is very efficient, while the designs for edit distance and LCS suffer from efficiency loss. The simulation also leverages
real-world genetic database (1000 Genomes) to show the test accuracy of the system. The efficiency improvement of
the construction will be seen as a future work.
This paper also leave the academic and industrial communities followings interesting open problems - to improve
the efficiency, can we make use of a symmetric searchable encryption to achieve the same GRT test function without
loss of privacy; is it possible to directly use a normal but not reversed searchable encryption technique in our context;
how can we protect the haplotype (encrypted and outsourced to SPU) even in the case where SPU colludes with a
group of TIs; how does CI “update” EDB (which is outsourced to SPU) but also “control” which parts of the EDB to
be “performed” test tasks by the SPU; what if there are different encryption formats in the back-end of the SPU, how
does it perform efficient and effective test.
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